2 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) . See H.R. 105 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) . 3 Class actions are defined more broadly under SLUSA than under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to SLUSA, a "covered class action" means: (i) any single lawsuit in which -(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on an alleged misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons or members; or (II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or members of the prospective class predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons or members; or (ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and involving common questions of law or fact, in which -(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and (II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose.
Section 101 of SLUSA, amending, § 16(f)(2)(A) of the Securities Act and § 28(f)(5)(B) of the Exchange Act. 7 See Section 101 of SLUSA, amending, Section 16(f)(2)(B) of the Securities Act and Section 28(f)(5)(C) of the Exchange Act (stating that "the term 'covered class action' does not include an exclusively derivative action brought by one or more shareholders on behalf of a corporation"). For the definition of "covered class action," see note 3 supra. The Securities Act allows for concurrent jurisdiction while the Securities Exchange Act provides exclusive federal court jurisdiction. See Section 22(a) of the Securities Act; Section 27(a) of the Exchange Act.
As another obstacle, the heightened "strong inference" pleading requirement set forth in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) 8 obligates a plaintiff in a securities fraud action to plead "with particularity both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant's intention 'to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.'" 9 When undertaking this task, a court must assess not only the inferences drawn by the plaintiff but also competing inferences that rationally arise from the facts alleged in the complaint.
10
As the Supreme Court reasoned:
An inference of fraudulent intent may be plausible, yet less cogent than other, nonculpable explanations for the defendant's conduct. To qualify as 8 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) .
9 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) . A plaintiff instituting a securities fraud action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, pursuant to the PSLRA, must adhere to the following:
(1)
A requirement that a plaintiff in the complaint in any private securities fraud action alleging material misstatements and/or omissions "specify each statement alleged to have been misleading; the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading; and if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." (2)
A requirement that in any private action under the 1934 Act in which the plaintiff "may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each such act or omission alleged to violate the [ Cir. 2008 ) (stating that "in certain circumstances, some form of collective scienter might be appropriate"). 12 The liberal "no set of facts" pleading standard embraced by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) , for non-fraud claims (under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) has been abandoned by the Court in favor of plausibility pleading that requires claimants to plead "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) . See the majority opinion in Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 548-70; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009 on a motion to dismiss, 13 plaintiffs frequently are challenged to marshal the requisite facts and strong inference of fraudulent intent to proceed with the litigation.
Statistical Evidence
Statistics illustrate this challenge as securities class actions are dismissed with regularity by the federal district courts. For example, in 2012, 47% of motions to dismiss were granted. 14 In addition, 17% of these motions were granted (and denied) in part, 5% were granted without prejudice, and 15% were voluntarily dismissed by claimants. Taking into account that 14% of motions to dismiss were denied in their entirety (plus the 17% of cases in which motions were denied in part), that signifies that approximately 31% of federal securities class actions proceeded in 2012 beyond the motion to dismiss stage.
15

Misleading Import of the Statistics
These numbers are misleading -perhaps for a surprising reason: They are artificially low due to the fact that plaintiffs today institute federal securities class 13 Section 21D(b)(3)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act.
14 NERA Economic Consulting, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2012 Full-Year Review at 16 (Jan. 29, 2013).
15 Id. at 16-17. Admittedly, these percentages add up to 98% rather than 100%. Note that these percentages are taken from the NERA Review. See note 14 supra. Irrespective of this seeming high percentage of cases that result in dismissal, "over the last 17 years since the PSLRA became law, the annual rate of dismissals has never exceeded the rate of settlements. In 2012, defendants settled 92 cases while achieving a dismissal of 72 cases." Gibson, Dunn, 2013 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update at 4 (July 16, 2013).
actions against fewer defendants than prior to the PSLRA's enactment. As contrasted with yesteryear, federal securities class action complaints alleging fraud-based violations (namely, Section 10(b) claims) currently often name only:
(1) key executive officers (such as the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and chief operating officer); (2) the chair of the board of directors; (3) outside directors who serve on key committees (such as the audit or compensation committee) whose alleged misconduct while serving as a committee member caused the improprieties; (4) the auditors (who certified the company's financial statements); and (5) the underwriters (of a subject registered offering).
16 Collateral actors -including attorneys, accountants (who have not certified financial statements), commercial and investment bankers (and their representatives), and consultants -are named as defendants in these class actions on relatively rare occasions.
17 16 With respect to naming outside directors and certain executive officers who do not serve as directors, note that judicial rejection of the group published and collective scienter doctrines render it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to name these fiduciaries in their class action complaint, particularly in view that all discovery ordinarily is stayed pending the court's ruling on the motion to discuss. See supra notes 11, 13 and accompanying text; infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. Further note that Section 10(b) litigation normally is pursued against directors, officers, underwriters, and auditors in a registered offering where the Section 11 remedy is unavailable due to the tracing requirement. See, e.g., Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F. 3d 
Impact of the PSLRA's Stay of Discovery and the Threat of Sanctions
As discussed earlier, the PSLRA ordinarily stays all discovery until and unless the claimants fend off the defendants' motion to dismiss.
18 Without access to documentary materials, use of interrogatories, and the taking of deposition testimony, the plaintiffs' task to plead fraud with the requisite particularity against collateral actors is difficult. Also pertinent is that the prospect of sanctions being 24 Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) ("In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."). In the PSLRA, Congress made clear that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may pursue aiders and abettors based on violations of the Securities Exchange Act. See Section 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. For a recent SEC enforcement action where the SEC emerged victorious in an action alleging aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b), see SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F. 3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012 38 See, e.g., Molecular Technology v. Valentine, 925 F. 2d 910, th Cir. 1991); sources cited supra notes 34-35, 37. 39 Janus Capital Fund, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011 . 40 Rule 10b-5(b) makes it unlawful for any person, using a means of interstate commerce, " [t] o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. . . . As a result, such collateral actors ordinarily are subject to Section 10(b) primary liability exposure only when they make an affirmative statement to investors, such as the issuance of an attorney opinion letter, 45 an auditor opinion in a prospectus or SEC annual report (Form 10-K), 46 or a fairness opinion issued by an investment banker. 47 In other contexts, unless a collateral actor (whose role is known to investors) orchestrates a scheme to defraud that goes beyond the representations communicated to investors, 48 primary Section 10(b) liability exposure will not prevail.
Impact of Supreme Court Decisions
The Rest of the Story
In view of these legislative and judicial developments, it becomes clear why plaintiffs are bringing Section 10(b) class action claims against fewer defendants.
While the enhanced pleading requirements mandated by the PSLRA annually result in dismissal of scores of securities class actions, 49 this is only part of the story. Additional developments discussed in this article also play a major role in limiting available avenues of recompense for aggrieved investors. When evaluated in conjunction with one another -the staying of discovery until and unless the motion to dismiss is fended off, the unavailability of the Section 10(b) private remedy against aiders and abettors, and the narrow construction of the requisite conduct that subjects a collateral actor to Section 10(b) primary liability exposurethe conclusion emerges that these developments adversely impact the quest of investors to hold those collateral actors perceived responsible for their financial losses to answer for the alleged misconduct. (June 22, 2012) . 51 Clearly, the relatively small amount of losses that an ordinary investor may suffer when victimized by alleged fraud is not of sufficient monetary amount to incentivize that investor to incur the costs of bringing a lawsuit on his/her own. That is a key rationale underlying the societal benefit of the class action mechanism.
